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Abstract
This paper proposes a speciﬁcation of Wooldridge’s (1995)
two step estimation method in which selectivity bias is due to
two sources rather than one. The main objective of the paper is
to show how the method can be applied in practise. The appli-
cation concerns an important problem in health economics: the
presence of adverse selection in the private health insurance mar-
kets on which there exists a large literature. The data for the
empirical application is drawn from the 2003/2004 Medical Ex-
penditure Panel Survey in conjunction with the 2002 National
Health Interview Survey.
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
In many applied economic problems, it is possible to observe data only
for a subset of individuals from the overall population. When observa-
tions are selected in a process that is not independent of the outcome
of interest a problem of sample selection may arise. Since Heckman
(1979)’s seminal paper, the problem of sample selection bias has been
extensively studied in economics literature with empirical applications.
Sample selection has been commonly treated in cross-sectional studies
but it has not been often considered a concern in panel data. In fact when
the selection process is time constant, panel data estimator may elim-
inate most forms of unobserved heterogeneity (Vella, 1998; Dustmann
and Rochina-Barrachina, 2000; 2007). However, the selection process in
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1many economic applications is not time constant. Wooldridge has pro-
posed a panel estimator for sample selection models which also accounts
for heterogeneity across individuals. In this note we present a new char-
acterization of the Wooldridge’s two-steps estimation method: we apply
the model to the case in which selectivity is due to two sources rather
than one. Then, we apply the proposed model to a test for adverse
selection in the private health insurance markets. The data for the em-
pirical application is drawn from the 2003/2004 Agency for Healthcare
Research Quality’s Medical Expenditure Panel— Household Component
(MEPS-HC)1 in conjunctions with the 2002 National Health Interview
Survey (NHIS)2. We use a subsample of 496 individuals followed for
two years resulting in 992 observations; the subsample includes single
individuals of working age (from 18 to 65 years old), they get health
insurance through individual markets or through their employers or or-
ganizations (such as unions, professional associations, or other groups).
For the employers-sponsored private coverage we include in the sample
individuals who have the possibility to choose between several plans3.
The key idea of the application is to test whether the individuals who
are more exposed to health risks also buy insurance contracts with more
coverage or higher expected payments. The critical statistical problem
is that the extension of insurance is only measured for those who are
insured and face positive health care expenditure. So there is a possible
sample selection bias eﬀect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 extends
Wooldridge(1995)’s model to the case in which selectivity is due to two
sources. Subsections 2.1 and 2.2 present the empirical illustration of
the model in detail. Section 3 concludes the paper with a discussion.
The deﬁnition of the variables, descriptive statistics and tables with
estimation coeﬃcients are in Appendix .
1MEPS is an annual survey whose main purpose is to examine insurance trends
and healthcare utilization among the non-institutionalized population in the United
States.
2National Centers for Health Statistics (NCHS), (Center for Disease Control and
Prevention)- NHIS provides rather detailed information about health status, diseases,
life-style, education and other individual characteristics.
3In U.S. it is quite common that employers provide health insurance as part of
the beneﬁts package for employees. In many employer-sponsored private coverage,
employers allow employees to choose between several plans, including both indemnity
insurance and managed care. Other employers oﬀer only one plan. Only if employers
allow insurers ﬂexibility in designing health insurance plans adverse selection may
occur.
22 Wooldridge Estimation With Two Selection Cri-
teria
We start by sketching Wooldridge’s (1995) sample selection model with
one selection criterion, then we present a speciﬁcation of the model in
which the selection process is based on two selection criteria rather than
one. According to Rochina-Barrachina (1999) we consider the following
problem:
d∗
it = zitγ + µi + uit
dit =0 if d∗
it ≤ 0




it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y∗
it if dit =1
yit not observed otherwise
(2)
where equation (1) deﬁnes the selection rule while equation (2) is the pri-
mary equation. i (i =1 ,...n) denotes the individuals while t (t =1 ,...,t)
denotes the panel. xit and zit are vector of exogenous variables with
possibly common elements and deﬁnitely with an exclusion restriction.
γ and β are unknown parameter vectors to be estimated. Terms µi
and αi are unobservable time invariant ﬁxed eﬀects4 which are possi-
bly correlated with each other. uit and εit are unobserved disturbances,
p o s s i b l yc o r r e l a t e dw i t he a c ho t h e r . The dependent variable in the pri-
mary equation(1), yit, is observed only for the observations satisfying
the selection rule i.e. only if the indicator variable dit =1 .
Similar to Chamberlain (1980), Wooldridge (1995) assumes the ﬁxed
eﬀects in the equation (2) have the following relationship:
µi = zi1δ1 + ... + zitδt + ci (3)
where ci is a random component. By substituting Chamberlain charac-
terization into the selection equation yields:
d
∗
it = zitγ + zi1δ1 + ... + zitδt + vit (4)
where vit = ci + uit. vit is distributed independently of zit and it is
normally distributed with zero mean and σ2 variance. The regression
function of αi on zit and vit is linear, accordingly:
E [αi |zit,v it]=xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt + φtvit (5)
4The individual eﬀects are assumed to be the ﬁxed eﬀets rather than the random
eﬀects.
3We do not observe vit, but only the binary indicator dit. Then, we replace
E [αi |zit,v it]w i t h :
E [αi |zit,d it =1]=xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt + φtE [vit |zit,d it =1] ( 6 )
Wooldridge assumes that εit is mean independent of zit conditional on
vit and its conditional mean is linear on vit:
E [εit |zit,v it]=E [εit |vit]=ρtvit (7)
By the Law of Iterated Expectation:
E [εit |zit,d it =1]=ρtE [vit |zit,d it =1] ( 8 )
From the above assumption, Wooldridge derives an explicit expression
for
E [αi + εit |zit,d it =1]=E [αi |zit,d it =1]+E [εit |zit,d it =1]=
= xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt +( φt + ρt)E [vit |zit,d it =1] (9)
where
E [vit |zit,d it =1]=λ(zi1γ1 + ... + zitγt)( 1 0 )
So, for each period, Wooldridge suggests to estimate a cross-sectional
probit model for participation and compute the Inverse Mills Ratio
(IMR), then, estimate the structural equation:
yit = xi1ψ1 + ... + xitψt + xitβ +( φt + ρt)λ(zi1γ1 + ... + zitγt)( 1 1 )
by using ﬁxed eﬀect OLS or pooled OLS for the sample for which dit =1
(Vella, 1998).
In the following we will propose a new speciﬁcation of Wooldridge two
step estimation method extended to the case in which selectivity is based
on two indices. We apply the method to a test for adverse selection. The
test is based on the hypothesis that there exists a positive correlation
between the high risk proﬁle individuals and the extension of health
insurance plan. In order to test for diﬀerences in insurance purchases by
high and low risk proﬁle individuals we use as indicator of completeness
of coverage the natural logarithm of health insurance reimbursement
(i.e. of healthcare expenditure paid by private insurance) as a share of
total health expenditures (Keeler et al., 1977, Browne and Doerpinghaus,
1993). Health insurance reimbursement is only deﬁned for those who
participate in insurance and face positive health care expenditure. So, we
consider the following characterization of Wooldridge’s sample selection
model where selectivity bias is a function of two indices:
4d∗
it1 = zit1γ
1 + µi1 + uit1
dit1 =0 if d∗
it1 ≤ 0





2 + µi2 + uit2
dit2 =0 if d∗
it2 ≤ 0




it = xitβ + αi + εit
yit = y∗
it if dit =1
yit not observed otherwise
(14)
where dit1 is an unobserved variable denoting insurance participation de-
cision and dit2 an unobserved variable denoting health care expenditure
participation decision. zit1 , zit2 and xit are vector of exogenous vari-
ables with possibly common elements and deﬁnitely with an exclusion
restriction. yit denotes the natural logarithm of health insurance reim-
bursement as share of total healthcare expenditure. yit is observed only
f o rt h es a m p l ef o rw h i c hdit1 =1a n ddit2 =1 . T e r m sµi1, µi2 and αi
are ﬁxed eﬀects. uit1, uit2 and εit are unobserved disturbances, possibly
correlated with each others.
The method of estimation relies crucially on the relationship be-
tween vit1 and vit2
5, in particular, the estimation depends on whether
the two error terms are independent or correlated, that is whether or
not Cov(vit1,v it2) = 0. The simplest case is when the disturbances are
uncorrelated (Maddala, 1983; Vella, 1998). If Cov(vit1,v it2)=0w ec a n
easily extend Wooldridge’s two-step estimation method to our model.
The correction term to include as regressor in the primary equation is:
E [εit |zit,d it1 =1 ,d it2 =1]=ρt1λ1
¡





zi12γ12 + ... + zit2γt2
¢ (15)
Then, we estimate the following model:















zi12γ12 + ... + zit2γt2
¢
(16)
The procedure consists in ﬁrst estimating, for each period, by two
single a cross-sectional probit model, the selection equation one and
the selection equation two. Than, the two corresponding Inverse Mills
5From Chamberlain trasformation of the individual eﬀects: vit1 = ci1 + uit1 and
vit2 = ci2 + uit2
5Ratio can be imputed and included as correction terms in the primary
equation. Thus, by ﬁxed eﬀe c to rp o o l e dO L S 6, estimate of the resulting
primary equation corrected for selection bias can be done for the sample
for which dit1 =1a n ddit2 =1 .
In the case vit1 and vit2 are correlated, so that Cov(vit1,v it2)=σ2
we have to use for each period cross-sectional bivariate probit methods




¯ ¯zit1,z it2dit1 =1 ,d it2 =1
¤
= ρt1M12 + ρt2M21 (17)
where Mij =( 1− σ12)









2.1 Bivariate Probit Model for Care Expenditure
and Insurance
I no r d e rt ot e s tw h e t h e rvit1 and vit2 are correlated we run for each year
a “preliminary” bivariate probit between insurance and health care ex-
penditure participation. In our model the dependent variable employed
to predict the probability of facing positive health care expenditure is a
binary variable that takes value one if individuals incur in positive health
care expenditure during the year of interview, and zero otherwise. The
independent variables employed can been categorized into three dimen-
sions: need for care (need to see a specialist, need to have treatments
or tests), predisposition to use health services (age, sex, race) and en-
abling factors (education, insurance, income, employment status, region
and residential location). Among enabling factor, we consider insurance
participation. An insured individual, in fact, may consume more med-
ical services and have a greater expenditure compared to an uninsured
one (Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1974). In this application, the situation is
further complicated by the fact that insurance participation itself may
be aﬀected by the likelihood of having positive health expenditure. The
choice of insurance coverage may be aﬀected by planned medical expen-
diture and expectations about medical care utilization. Thus, in order
to test the potential endogeneity of health insurance and at the same
time whether the covariance between health insurance choice and health
expenditure participation is signiﬁcantly diﬀerent of zero, we run for
6In this analysis ﬁxed eﬀect however presents a signiﬁcant limitation with the
respect to pooled OLS : we can not assess the eﬀect of variables that do not vary
very much within group: i.e. degree of education, race, region, etc. that can impact
signiﬁcantly the health insurance reimbursement. Also, explanatory variables whose
change across time is constant — e.g. age — can not be included.
6each year a cross sectional recursive bivariate probit models (Maddala,
1999). For each period, the recursive structure builds on a ﬁrst reduced
form equation for the potentially endogenous dummy measuring insur-
ance participation and a second structural form equation determining
the expenditure participation:
d∗
it1 = zi11γ11 + ... + zit1γt1 + vit1 (18)
d∗
it2 = zi12γ12 + ... + zit2γt2 + vit2 =




it2 are latent variables, and dit1 and dit2 are dichotomous
variables observed according to the rule:
½
ditj =0 if d∗
itj ≤ 0
ditj =1 if d∗
itj > 0 ; j =1 ,2( 2 0 )
zitj and wit are vectors of exogenous variable with possibly common el-
ements, γ and ξ are parameter vectors, ζ is a scalar parameter. The
dependent variable dit1 used to predict the probability of being insured
is again a dummy variable that takes value one if respondents are insured
and zero otherwise. The vector of explanatory variables zit1 used to pre-
dict the probability of being insured includes both exogenous variables
that are determinants of health expenditure and personal attributes that
are only determinative of health insurance choice7 (i . e .e m p l o y m e n ts t a -
tus, union status, insurance attitude8).
We assume that, for each period, the error terms vit1 and vit2 are
distributed as bivariate normal, with zero mean and variance covariance
7Estimation of a recursive bivariate probit model requires some considerations for
the identiﬁcation of the model parameters: at least one of the insurance equation
exogenous variables has not to be included in the expenditure equation as explana-
tory variable (Maddala, 1983). Following Maddala’s approach we include among
explanatory variables in the insurance equation a measure of attitude toward health
insurance participation and the indicator of employment status and union status.
8MEPS contains a self-administered questionnaire (SAQ) with questions that as-
certain health-related attitudes; respondents were asked if they agree strongly, or
disagree with the following statements “Health insurance is not worth the money it
costs”; “ I am more likely to take risks than the average person”. The ﬁrst statement
is directly related to an individual’s preferences for health insurance: respondent is
asked to directly assess the value of health insurance relative to his perception of its
cost. In contrast, the second statement provides indirect measures that are likely to
be associated with attitudes toward health insurance. While individual’s preferences
for health insurance may aﬀect the extent of insurance purchase, attitude toward
health insurance might inﬂuence decisions to purchase health insurance. Hence we
include the ﬁrst indicator in the structural equation for insurance reimbursement,
and the second one in the insurance participation equation.
7matrix Σ. Σ has values of 1 on the leading diagonal and correlations
















In the above setting, the exogeneity condition is stated in terms of
the correlation coeﬃcient, which can be interpreted as the correlation be-
tween the unobservable explanatory variables of the two diﬀerent equa-
tions. The two selection equations can be estimated separately as single
probit models only in the case of independent error terms vit1 and vit2
i.e. the coeﬃcient ρjk is not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent of zero (k =1 ,2). If
the error terms vit1 and vit2 are independent we can deal with the above
model as independent equations (Maddala, 1983) and apply the model
in the equation (16).
Table 3 shows the correlation coeﬃcients and the p-value for each




= 0 is not rejected;
hence, we can deal with the model in the equation (16) and compute
Inverse Mills Ratio by using the two selection equations as single probit
models. Tables 4 and 5 show coeﬃcients for insurance choice and ex-
penditure participation equation estimated using bivariate probit speci-
ﬁcation.
2.2 Empirical Illustration of Structural Equation
In order to perform the correlation test, ﬁrst we classify individuals
as being high and low risk proﬁle individuals. Individuals are classi-
ﬁed as being high-risk if their health status is not good. As a mea-
sure of health status we use SAH (self-assessed health)9,w h i c hi saﬁve
category variable rating from poor to excellent. We construct a bi-
nary variable (high risk) with the value one if individuals report that
t h e i rh e a l t hs t a t u si sf a i ro rp o o ra n dz e r oo t h e r w i s e( e x c e l l e n t ,v e r y
good, good). Then, we classify as high-risk individuals those whose
self-reported health is fair or poor. In addition to the health indica-
tor, the independent variables, used to control for diﬀerences in policy,
can be grouped in the following categories: demographic variables (age,
sex), socioeconomic variables (education, income10) individual’s prefer-
9SAH is supported by a large literature that shows the strong predictive relation-
ship between people’s self rating of their health and mortality or morbidity (Idler
and Beyamini, 1997; Kennedy et al. 1998). Moreover, self assessed health correlates
strongly with more complex health indices such as functional ability or indicators
derived from health service use (Unden and Elofosson, 2006).
10We do not include in the structural equation employment and union status among
socioeconomic variables to avoid multicollinearity problems since they are strictly
8ences for health insurance, health insurance plan characteristics (out-
of-pocket annual premium, co-payment, whether insurance plan covers
prescription drug costs and dental bills, whether respondents get their
insurance through their employers or other organizations), observable
risk (whether individuals suﬀer from any form of disabilities that limit
their activities11).Moreover, we control for the healthcare expenditure
paid by other sources diﬀerent of insurance company.
Table 6 shows the coeﬃcients for the structural insurance reimburse-
ment equation estimated using pooled OLS speciﬁcation. We ﬁnd evi-
dence for adverse selection: table 6 shows that the coeﬃcient estimate
for the variable ”high risk” is positively and signiﬁcantly correlated with
the health insurance reimbursement. Other than regular variables, two
independent variables here are the IMR (Inverse Mills Ratio) which
have been estimated from the ﬁrst and second probit selection equa-
tions. When added to the outcome equation as additional regressors,
they measure the sample selection eﬀect due to lack of observations on
the non-health insurance purchasers and non-health expenditure partic-
ipants. These variables should be statistically signiﬁcant to justify the
use of Wooldridge two-step estimation. Since in our models they are sta-
tistically signiﬁcant there may be sample selection problem in the data
and we need to use the extension of Wooldridge method.
3 Summary and Conclusions
In this paper we discuss Wooldridge’s (1995) two step estimator that
address the problem of sample selection and correlated individual het-
erogeneity in selection and outcome equation simultaneously. We show
how it can be extended to the case in which selectivity bias is due to two
sources rather than one. The appropriate selection correction depends on
whether the error terms for the two selection equations are independent.
Thus we have run, for each year, a “preliminary” cross-sectional bivari-




= 0. The bivariate probit indicated




= 0 could not be rejected. Thus,
we have estimated the selection equations and constructed the estimate
of the selection correction terms using two separated standard probit
model estimates for each year in order to calculate the correction terms
(IMRs). The selectivity terms included as a regressor in the equation of
correlated with the variable that measure whether respondents have an employer or
union-sponsored private coverage.
11The variable that we use as indicator of limited activity controls for the portion
of risk observable to the insurer. The activity limitations indicator is expected to
be positively related to the generosity of the health insurance plan, because being
limited increases the likelihood of need for medical care
9interest (estimated using pooled ordinary least squares regression) are
simple extensions of those proposed by Wooldridge (1995).
Since not many studies exist that use this method in practise, we
have applied the proposed model. The application concerns an impor-
tant problem in health economics: the presence of adverse selection in
the private health insurance markets. We have tested whethere there
exists a positive correlation between the amount of insurance an indi-
vidual buys and his ex-post risk experience. As indicator of generosity
and completeness of health plan, we have employed the natural logarithm
of health insurance reimbursement (i.e. of health care expenditure paid
by private insurance) as a share of total health expenditures. Our ﬁnd-
ings support the hypothesis of a systematic relation between illness of
individuals and insurance choice.
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4A p p e n d i x
Table 1: Variables Name and Deﬁnition
 Variables Name Variables Definition
age age in years
male  1 if male, 0 otherwise
white 1 if white, 0 otherwise
black  1 if black, 0 otherwise
other_race 1 if other race, 0 otherwise
northeast 1 if lives in Northeast region, 0 otherwise
midweast 1 if lives in Midweast region, 0 otherwise
west 1 if lives in  West region, 0 otherwise
south 1 if lives in  South region, 0 otherwise
msa 1 if lives in Metropolitan Statistical Area, 0 otherwise
income total annual income
union 1 if union status, 0 otherwise
employed 1 if employed, 0 otherwise
education 1 if had high_school, master or PhD degree , 0 otherwise
expenditure total annual health care expenditure
lnreimbursement natural logarithm of reimbursement paid by insurance
share_reimbursement natural logarithm of reimbursement paid by insurance as share 
of total annual health care expenditure
lnexp_paid_other_sources natural logarithm of expenditure paid by other sources
family size family size
high_risk 1 if current health is poor or fair, 0 otherwise
activity limitations 1 if has limited in any activities because health
 problems, 0 otherwise
need care 1 if needs for care during the year of interview, 0 otherwise
need specialist 1 if needs for specialist during the year of interview, 0 otherwise
insured 1 if insured, 0 otherwise
insurance_preference 1 if agree with "Health insurance is not worth the money it 
costs", 0 otherwise
insurance_attitude 1 if is likely to take risk, 0 otherwise
dental_bills 1 if plan covers dental bills, 0 otherwise
drug_costs 1 if plan covers drug costs, 0 otherwise
group_insurance 1 if gets  insurance through their employers or organizations, 
lncopayment natural logarithm of copayment
mills1 mills ratio insurance partecipation
mills2 mills ratiohealth care expenditure partecipation
13Table 2: Summary Statistics
  All Insured Uninsured
Age 44 44.04    43.61
Male 0.3306 0.3333  0.2973
Income  42519.25 44452.26   18539.39 
Total health care expenditure 35000.09 3592.092 2357.689
Copayment  879.3203
Group Insurance  0.9223
Annual premium  1821.522
Northeast 0.1532 0.1634 0.0270
South 0.3679 0.2897 0.5676
West 0.1966 0.3518 0.2162
Midwest 0.2823 0.1949 0.1892 
White 0.8568 0.8758 0.6216
Black 0.0968 0.0806 0.2973
Other Race 0.0464 0.0436 0.0810
Metropolitan statistical area 0.8145  0.83 0.6216
High Risk Individuals 0.0776 0.0708  0.1622  
Activity limitations 0.2520 0.2462 0.3243
Low Insurance Attitude 0.2218 0.2233 0.2027
Low Insurance Preferences 0.2429 0.2321 0.3783
Number of observations 992 918 74
14Table 3: Preliminary BivariateProbit Correlation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
                 Dependent Variables        pho  p-value
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2003  -0.1340    0.893     
Positive Expenditure/ Be Insured 2004  -0.3727 0.446            
Note: sample size 496.
Table 4: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
   Expenditure 2003 Be Insured 2003
intercept 0.5013  (0.659) -1.6287 (0.032)
age 0.0264  (0.075)  0.0076(0.378) 
male -1.1982(0.000)  0.0939(0.699) 
black -0.3491(0.449) -0.9542(0.000) 
other_race -0.2243(0.754)   -0.5702(0.204)
family size -0.1871(0.109) 0.2500(0.012)







employed 0.4195(0.149)  
education 0.0765(0.908) 0.7719(0.009) 
need care -0.2017(0.560) 
need specialist 0.8533(0.160)
insurance attitude -0.4376(0.068)
Note: sample size 496.
15Table 5: Cross-Sectional Bivariate Probit Estimation Coeﬃcients
(p-value in parentheses)
   Expenditure 2004 Be Insured 2004
intercept 1.6613(0.145)     -2.823(0.008)
age  0.0112(0.441)  0.0133(0.137) 
male -1.4139(0.000) -0.0372(0.880) 
black -0.3407(0.472) -0.9401(0.001)
other_race 0.5758(0.448) -0.6887(0.129) 
family size -0.2696(0.012) 0.2954(0.002)
msa -0.0089(0.981) 0.6012(0.014) 
northeast -0.4157(0.406) 0.9329(0.061)
midwest -0.3945(0.367) 0.1165(0.664) 
west -0.5889(0.177) -0.0947(0.733)








Note: sample size 496
16Table 6: Pooled OLS Regression Results.
Risk Variable: Self-Assessed Health.
 Preidictor Variables Coefficients  p-values
intercept 0.5309 0.000     
age  0.0007 0.167
male -0.0029   0.830 
msa -0.0245 0.094
northeast 0.0044 0.781 
midwest 0.0264 0.042 
west -0.0102 0.488 
black -0.0016 0.944
other race -0.0285  0.248 
education -0.0265 0.274 
income   -4.64e-07     0.008
group_insurance   0.07812     0.000
lnpremium  -8.42e-07  0.689 
lncopayment -0.0384    0.000
lnexp_paid_other_sources -0.0160 0.003
dental_bills  0.0439    0.000
drug_ costs 0.0917   0.000
high_risk 0.0776 0.000
activity limitations 0.0406   0.001 
insurance preferences -0 .0462  0.000
mills1 -0.1566  0.034 
mills2 -0.0899   0.079 
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